Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy / Francesco Lippi.

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Material type: Text

TextPublication details: Northampton, Mass., USA : Edward Elgar, c1999.Description: viii, 162 p. ; 25 cmISBN:

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Item type	Current library	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode
Books	Central Library	332.1 LIP (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Available		026269

Includes bibliographical references (p. 149-156) and index.

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